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extract_git_authority

Function extract_git_authority 

Source
pub fn extract_git_authority(url: &str) -> Option<String>
Expand description

Extract the canonical authority from a git remote URL for host-scoping.

The authority is the host[:port] portion of the URL, canonicalized per the WHATWG URL Standard’s host-parsing algorithm (via the url crate):

  • Domain names are IDNA-processed and ASCII case-folded.
  • IPv4 addresses (including non-canonical forms like octal/hex octets) are normalized to canonical dotted-decimal.
  • IPv6 literals are normalized and returned in bracketed form ([2001:db8::cafe]).
  • Default scheme ports are stripped (:443/:80 for HTTPS/HTTP, :22 for SSH, :9418 for the git protocol); any other port is preserved.

Security-critical / standards-based: the URL is parsed structurally by url::Url::parse — the authority (scheme, userinfo, host, port) is separated from the path, query, and fragment by the same state machine browsers use, so an @, /, ?, or # appearing in the path or query can never be misread as part of the authority. This closes the Sol P1 path/query @ confusion finding (#1429), which affected the previous hand-written parser.

url::Url::parse only applies IDNA/case canonicalization to the host automatically for its built-in “special” schemes (http/https); ssh and git are not “special” to the url crate, so their host is re-canonicalized explicitly via url::Host::parse — the same standards-based host algorithm, applied uniformly regardless of scheme.

Backslash is rejected outright (fail closed), not parsed. The WHATWG URL Standard treats \ as equivalent to / within a “special” scheme (http/https), ending the authority early — but the pinned libgit2 1.9.x C parser treats \ as an ordinary authority character and keeps splitting userinfo at the last @. The same input string is therefore assigned a different authority by this function than by the transport that actually opens the connection: https://github.com\@evil.example/x resolves to github.com here but libgit2 connects to evil.example. Any input containing \ is a parser-differential attack surface, not a case this function can resolve by parsing more cleverly — it returns None unconditionally rather than risk agreeing with the wrong parser. See #1429 Kimi-K3 r3 P1.

Returns None for local paths (file://, bare paths), malformed URLs, URLs using a scheme outside [ALLOWED_SCHEMES], URLs containing a backslash, or URLs where the authority cannot be reliably determined. Callers must treat None as “authority unknown” and refuse the credential, not fall back to an unscoped release.

§Examples

https://github.com/user/repo.git        → "github.com"
https://USER@github.com/user/repo.git   → "github.com"
https://github.com:443/user/repo.git    → "github.com"   (default port stripped)
https://github.com:8443/user/repo.git   → "github.com:8443"
https://evil.example/repo@github.com    → "evil.example" (path @ ignored)
ssh://git@github.com:22/user/repo.git   → "github.com"
git@github.com:user/repo.git            → "github.com"   (scp-like)
https://[2001:db8::cafe]/repo.git       → "[2001:db8::cafe]"
https://github.com\@evil.example/x.git  → None            (backslash rejected)