pub fn resolve_service_signing_key(
secrets_dir: &Path,
service_name: &str,
profile: SecretsProfile,
) -> Result<SigningKey>Expand description
Resolve the Ed25519 signing key a service process should use to sign its
own RPC responses in --ipc (multi-process) deployment.
§PolicyService is special
PolicyService’s identity IS the root/CA key, not an independent
per-service key: bootstrap_manager::do_bootstrap registers
bootstrap_pubkeys["policy"] = root_key.verifying_key() (the same value
persisted flat at secrets_dir/signing-key), rather than generating a
secrets_dir/policy/signing-key like every other service gets.
Resolving “policy” via the generic per-service path
(load_or_generate_service_signing_key) reads/generates a different
file ({secrets_dir}/policy/signing-key) that bootstrap never populated —
so on first --ipc startup it silently mints a fresh, unrelated key. Every
peer that resolves “policy” from the trust store (seeded from
bootstrap-pubkeys) still expects root_key.verifying_key(), so
PolicyService’s actual responses fail verification with “Response signed
by unexpected key” (#759) — a sibling gap to the CA-derivation fallback
#441 already removed from resolve_service_key.
SecretsProfile::PerServiceScoped: the credential provider already scopessecrets_dirto that one service, so the flat top-level file is correct for every service, policy included.SecretsProfile::SharedDirectory:secrets_diris shared across every spawned service process, so non-policy services use a{service_name}/subdirectory to avoid collisions — but policy must still resolve to the flat root/CA key, matching what bootstrap registered.