Expand description
Access Vector Cache — the fast local decision cache the PEP consults per op (S4 / #570).
SELinux-style AVC: the PEP (S2) asks the AVC for a decision on every op; on a hit it
returns a cached Decision with no Casbin, no signature verify, no lattice walk —
just a hash lookup. On a miss it calls the TeEvaluator (the PDP) once, caches the
result, and returns it. Fail-closed: any ambiguity (wrong generation, poisoned lock,
evaluator absent) → DENY.
§The hot path (what must be cheap)
PEP.check(op) → AVC.decide(key) ─hit→ return cached Decision (sub-µs, lock-free read)
└miss→ evaluator.evaluate(...) ; insert ; returnThe cache KEY is (generation, subject_type, clearance, object_type, label, action). The
TE types are interned ids and the clearance/label are S1’s structured
SecurityLabels — which are Copy + Hash (a packed level/assurance/u64-bitset, S1
confirmed cheap), so the whole key is Copy and hashes cheaply with no dominance walk
and no signature verify on a hit (#570 requirement). We deliberately key on the
resolved context, not on raw strings/paths: string matching (Casbin’s job) is done once
at compile time, never per op.
§Token = distributed AVC entry (design §2, §6)
The OAuth access token IS an AVC entry, minted by the authority and carried by the
subject. It encodes {label_ceiling, op_set, ttl} (design §11). The mapping:
access token T ──(verified ONCE at bind/refresh by the PEP)──► AvcSeed
T.cnf / sub → subject_type + clearance (subject ctx, design §2)
T.label_ceiling → the max object label the token authorizes (per-op floor still applies)
T.op_set → the actions the token authorizes
T.exp → AvcEntry.valid_until (ttl-bounded cache lifetime)Verifying the token signature is a bind/refresh-time event (design §7: mint per-task,
AVC caches for ttl), NOT per op. Once seeded, per-op decisions are local lookups. The
token’s {label_ceiling, op_set} are an additional deny-only gate the PEP applies via
TokenScope; the mandatory lattice floor + TE matrix are still evaluated independently
by the PDP (a token can only narrow — design §10).
Structs§
- AvcKey
- Cache key: the fully-resolved, interned per-op context. All
Copyids → cheap hash. Tagged withgenerationso a policy reload (new generation) misses every stale entry without an explicit flush walk. - Caching
Avc - Concrete AVC over a
TeEvaluatorPDP and a concurrent map. Lock-free reads viadashmap; the only work on a hit is a hash + ttl compare. - Token
Scope - The token-derived gate the PEP applies on top of the PDP decision (design §10 / §6). Deny-only: the token can only narrow. The PDP (lattice floor + TE matrix) is evaluated independently; this just enforces what the access token authorized.
Traits§
- Avc
- The Access Vector Cache interface — what the PEP (S2) calls per op.