pub fn domain_label(domain: &DedupDomain) -> SecurityLabelExpand description
Derive a trusted, content-bound SecurityLabel from a DedupDomain.
The label is derived from the domain’s structural properties — the trust
boundary determines the level axis, and the assurance floors at Classical
(the substrate cannot prove PQ-hybrid for stored content). This is not
caller-asserted: the domain is the content’s physical provenance, set by the
storage layer at domain construction, not by the ingest caller.
Mapping:
TrustBoundary::Local→Level::Internal: node-local content is at least org-internal.TrustBoundary::SharedRemote→Level::Confidential: federated/remote content carries higher sensitivity.
Compartment bits are not populated here: the lattice internment lives in
the policy layer, not the storage layer. Compartment isolation is already
structural — each domain maps to a distinct physical storage root
(DedupDomain::relative_path) — so cross-compartment content leakage is
physically impossible at the substrate level. The MAC label’s level axis
provides the independent clearance enforcement on top.
Enriching the seal label with interned compartment bits is a follow-up gated
on threading the Lattice to the CAS
layer.