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domain_label

Function domain_label 

Source
pub fn domain_label(domain: &DedupDomain) -> SecurityLabel
Expand description

Derive a trusted, content-bound SecurityLabel from a DedupDomain.

The label is derived from the domain’s structural properties — the trust boundary determines the level axis, and the assurance floors at Classical (the substrate cannot prove PQ-hybrid for stored content). This is not caller-asserted: the domain is the content’s physical provenance, set by the storage layer at domain construction, not by the ingest caller.

Mapping:

Compartment bits are not populated here: the lattice internment lives in the policy layer, not the storage layer. Compartment isolation is already structural — each domain maps to a distinct physical storage root (DedupDomain::relative_path) — so cross-compartment content leakage is physically impossible at the substrate level. The MAC label’s level axis provides the independent clearance enforcement on top.

Enriching the seal label with interned compartment bits is a follow-up gated on threading the Lattice to the CAS layer.