Expand description
XET content provenance store (the #436 / #509 fix).
§Why this exists
The XET CAS is global and content-addressed: bytes are deduplicated by
their computed merkle root with no per-tenant namespacing. The pre-existing
getBlob authorization (condition (b)) decided entitlement from a git-xet /
git-lfs pointer blob committed into the grant repo’s HEAD tree. That
pointer is caller-committed and therefore forgeable: Tenant B can commit
oid sha256:<Tenant A's private merkle> into their own repo and read A’s
private bytes back over the shared CAS. The pointer-only check structurally
cannot tell a planted reference from a genuine one.
§What this provides
A persisted, server-side-only mapping merkle_hex → {repo_id, …} recording
which repositories actually contributed (uploaded) the bytes behind a merkle.
The bytes themselves remain globally deduplicated in the CAS — only this
provenance mapping is per-repo. The read gate consults this store and fails
closed: if no provenance record binds the merkle to the grant repo, the
request is denied. A forgeable pointer can never, on its own, grant access.
§Trust boundary (load-bearing)
record() is the only mutating entry point and MUST be called exclusively
from a server-authenticated code path that has already established the
pushing repo’s identity (NOT from caller-supplied identity such as $USER or
a request field). See the module-level note in registry.rs for the wiring
status of the authenticated upload binding (issue #509, part 2).
Structs§
- XetProvenance
Store - Persisted
(merkle_hex → {repo_id})provenance mapping for XET CAS content.