Expand description
Delegation-chain + ceiling/attenuation validation — the core correctness component of S5 (#571).
Per the epic (#547, design “ceiling/attenuation”): every delegation in a UCAN chain must be a SUBSET (attenuation) of its delegator’s authority — a child can never widen. This module walks the proof chain of a UCAN and enforces, at each link, the two structural invariants that make the chain a genuine ceiling:
- Linkage: the delegate UCAN’s issuer must equal the delegator
(proof) UCAN’s audience. Authority flows
proof.audience → ucan.issuer; a chain where the issuer was not the party the proof delegated to is forged. - Attenuation (⊆): every capability the delegate UCAN claims must be
authorized by the delegator’s capability set
(
super::capability::set_attenuates). A delegate that widens on resource, ability, or caveats is rejected.
Plus the temporal and structural gates, which are TWO independent checks:
- Relative window containment ([
window_within]): a child cannot outlive its parent — its[not_before, expiration]window must be within the delegator’s. This bounds the chain shape but says nothing about the wall-clock. - Absolute validity at
now(super::token::Ucan::is_valid_at): EVERY link must be live at the validation instant — not expired and not future-dated (not_before <= now <= expiration). Relative containment alone is NOT sufficient: a fully-attenuating, correctly-linked chain in which every link has already EXPIRED still satisfies window containment, so without the absolute check it would validate and could be replayed/compiled into a ceiling. Both gates are therefore enforced, per link.
And recursion to the root (a root has no proofs and grants whatever it
self-asserts), with a bounded proof depth (MAX_PROOF_DEPTH) so a
maliciously deep nested-proof chain cannot exhaust the stack (a DoS guard, not
an authority concern).
Fail-closed everywhere. Any malformation, missing link, widening, out-of-window, expired/not-yet-valid, or over-depth condition rejects the entire chain. This is intentionally conservative TCB code: a false reject is a denied request; a false accept is a privilege escalation, so the asymmetry is always resolved toward rejection.
§Scope (milestone 1)
Signature verification is assumed already done by
super::token::Ucan::verify_signatures — validate_chain covers linkage,
attenuation, relative window containment, absolute validity at now, and the
depth bound. Callers run signatures first, then this; the combined entry point
validate does both in the correct order. Revocation lists and a richer
multi-proof “any-path” model are milestone-2 seams; M1 validates the
single-delegator-per-link chain (each UCAN’s proofs[i] is a delegator that
must independently cover the claims).
Enums§
- Chain
Error - Why a delegation chain was rejected. Every variant is a fail-closed denial.
Constants§
- MAX_
PROOF_ DEPTH - Maximum delegation-chain (nested-proof) depth this validator will walk. A
chain deeper than this is rejected fail-closed (
ChainError::DepthExceeded) before recursion can exhaust the stack. UCAN delegation chains are short by construction (a handful of hops); this bound is generous for legitimate use while capping a hostileproofs-within-proofsnesting (a DoS vector at both parse time and walk time). The same bound is enforced at CBOR decode insuper::token::Ucan::from_cborso an over-deep token is refused before it is ever walked.
Functions§
- validate
- The full fail-closed validation a compiler front-end runs before lowering a
UCAN into a ceiling: (1) structure, (2) signatures, (3) delegation chain +
attenuation + temporal validity at
now, in that order. ReturnsOk(())only if every link is structurally sound, correctly signed under the hybrid policy, properly linked, strictly attenuating, within its delegator’s window, AND live atnow(not expired, not future-dated), with the chain no deeper thanMAX_PROOF_DEPTH. - validate_
chain - Recursively validate the delegation chain rooted at
ucan(structural + temporal — run signatures separately, or usevalidate).