Expand description
CONNECT-time authentication + tenant binding for the /moq WebTransport
plane (#1153).
CONNECT-time authentication for the /moq WebTransport plane (#1153).
The /moq WebTransport CONNECT is an entry point onto a shared streaming
plane. This module authenticates it before any stream is established
(the accept loop verifies the credential and refuses the CONNECT — by
dropping the request, never completing the handshake — before
Request::ok() runs), then binds the accepted session to a tenant derived
from the verified identity.
§Credential accepted, and why
The accepted credential is a bearer JWT carried in the HTTP/3
[Authorization] header (Authorization: Bearer <jwt>). It is
verified, not merely parsed: crate::auth::jwt::decode_with_key
checks the EdDSA signature (and rejects any non-EdDSA alg, defeating
algorithm-confusion), exp/iat validity, and the expected aud. A
forged signature, a stripped claim, or an expired token fails closed.
This reuses the same verified-identity primitive the RPC envelope path uses
(hyprstream_rpc::auth::jwt/Claims) so the /moq plane and the RPC
plane agree on what “verified subject” means — the derivation can be
shared with the sibling Casbin-domain work (#1151) rather than invented a
second time.
§Why the tenant is NOT read from the token
Per the #1128 spike and #1146 (T2.1 / PR #1147), JWT scope/claim fields are
not enforced at the verifier today — any tenant-shaped claim inside the
token is caller-supplied data and therefore unenforceable (the existing
cap field is the cautionary tale: present, unread). So the tenant is
never taken from the token. It is derived, server-side, from the
verified subject by [MoqConnectAuthz::tenant_resolver] — an
authoritative subject→tenant provisioning map the operator controls. The
token proves who the peer is; the resolver is the trust root for which
tenant that subject belongs to. See VerifiedConnect.
§What this guarantees today (read before assuming isolation)
With a MoqConnectAuthz installed, an unauthenticated or tenant-less
/moq CONNECT is refused (fail-closed), and a connected peer can only
enumerate/subscribe to its own tenant’s broadcasts (structural scoping via
crate::moq_authz::tenant_scoped_consumer). This is a transport-plane,
metadata/announce isolation boundary on the /moq consumer path. It is
NOT a cluster-wide tenant guarantee: frame content was already
AEAD-sealed + chained-HMAC’d at the source (the relay/consumer holds no
enc_key/mac_key), and other planes (RPC subject authorization, event
prefixes, VFS) have their own independent stories documented in the #1128
spike. Relay-mode (with_moq_relay) additionally refuses unauthenticated
CONNECTs but the relay still routes by track name — it must, to rendezvous
publisher and subscriber — so announce-name visibility through a relay is
inherent to relay mode and not something this boundary removes.
Structs§
- MoqConnect
Authz - CONNECT-time authentication + tenant-binding config for the
/moqplane. - Verified
Connect - The outcome of a successful CONNECT-time verification: a peer whose
subjectwas verified by signature, and the tenant the server resolved for that subject. The tenant is authoritative server-side state, not a caller-supplied field.
Constants§
- AUTHORIZATION_
HEADER - HTTP/3 header carrying the bearer JWT.
- BEARER_
SCHEME - Scheme expected in the
Authorizationheader value.
Functions§
- bearer_
token - Extract the bearer token from the
Authorizationheader.
Type Aliases§
- Verified
Subject Tenant Resolver - Server-side map from a verified subject to its tenant.