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verify_sender_bound_token

Function verify_sender_bound_token 

Source
pub fn verify_sender_bound_token(
    token: &ExchangedToken,
    dpop_pubkey: &[u8; 32],
) -> Result<()>
Expand description

Verify an ExchangedToken is actually sender-bound to dpop_pubkey before the caller (the browser sender-bound exchange) trusts it (#1425 r2 P2).

parse_exchange_response treats an omitted or Bearer token_type as backward-compatible (other, non-browser callers of this endpoint shape still expect that). But fetch_exchange_token is exclusively the sender-bound browser exchange: a response that comes back as Bearer (a misrouted request, a downgraded/compatibility responder, or a proxy that stripped the DPoP semantics) must be rejected here rather than silently installed as if it were correctly bound — the caller only checks token_type once, at parse time, and every downstream RPC assumes the installed credential really is cnf.jkt-bound to this key.

This also independently confirms the token’s cnf.jkt (decoded from the unverified JWT payload — the server re-verifies the signature and binding on every RPC; this is client-side defense in depth, not the trust boundary) equals ed25519_dpop_jkt of the exact key that produced the proof, so a compatibility/misrouted response bound to some other key cannot be mistaken for a token this browser can actually use.