pub fn compile_sign_load_install(
grant: &Ucan,
lattice: &Lattice,
permissions: &impl PermissionMap,
enrollment: BTreeMap<String, SecurityLabel>,
approval: PolicyApproval,
ed_sk: &SigningKey,
pq_sk: &MlDsaSigningKey,
) -> Result<(Arc<CompiledPolicy>, bool), BootPolicyError>Expand description
Compile a validated grant into a TE policy, hybrid-PQC-sign it, verify it
once at load, and install it process-globally. Returns the installed
CompiledPolicy.
The signer and verifier use the supplied policy-authority keypair and run
the artifact through the full sign_policy → PolicyLoader::load path
(rather than short-circuiting the crypto). require_pq = true — the ML-DSA
outer layer is mandatory; a classical-only signature is rejected.
The caller MUST have already validated grant’s UCAN chain — compile
reads only its capability set. Enrollment is the authority-owned
DID→clearance table (#698), embedded in and covered by the signature.
approval MUST come from an upstream-verified S5 approval binding (normally
PolicyApproval::from_verified); this generic path never derives an
approval from the policy it is loading. The loader independently recomputes
the compiled policy hash and rejects a mismatched approval.
§Return: (policy, installed) — the write-once truth
Returns the policy this call compiled+verified together with an
installed flag from [install_compiled_policy]: true iff this call’s
policy actually became the process-global seam, false if one was already
installed and the global slot is unchanged. The returned Arc is always this
call’s own artifact regardless — but when installed == false, that artifact
is NOT what crate::mac::compiled_policy returns.
§Write-once limitation (do not build a real-policy swap on this yet)
The seam is a OnceLock: the first installed policy pins it for the
process lifetime. So this API installs a real policy ONLY on a node that has
not already installed the boot baseline. Configured boot artifacts are
loaded before the baseline; they cannot replace it afterward. Swapping a
newer verified generation in atomically (e.g. ArcSwap<CompiledPolicy> keyed
by generation) is the follow-up; until then, treat installed == false as
“the earlier policy still governs the seam”, never as a successful swap.
§Key provenance
ed_sk and pq_sk are the policy authority’s hybrid signing keys. The
approval is a separate reviewed binding supplied by the caller and checked
independently from the artifact signature.