Expand description
S4 policy bootload (#570): the missing daemon-boot step that installs a
verified CompiledPolicy so the MAC PDP inputs are real.
Everything else in the S4 stack was already built (the
LatticeTeEvaluator PDP, the
CachingAvc, the PolicyLoader, the
SignedPolicy sign/verify path), but
nothing ever ran the compile → sign → verify-load → install chain at
startup. So crate::mac::compiled_policy (the process-global OnceLock)
stayed None, and every downstream seam fell back to deny-all — in
particular crate::mac::exchange_enrollment_resolver returned the
DenyUnlabeledResolver,
which is what kept #698’s already-merged
EnrollmentSubjectContextResolver
inert. This module is the one missing wire.
Installing a compiled policy makes the PDP inputs real: it flips
crate::mac::compiled_policy to Some, so the enrollment resolver
resolves genuine clearances instead of denying every DID. The active 9P PEP
records the loaded generation and policy hash on every audited decision.
§Fail-closed
The signer is hybrid (EdDSA + ML-DSA-65 COSE composite) and the loader
verifies with require_pq = true (design §14 — never Ed25519-only).
Configured artifacts require only the enrolled authority’s public keys;
absent configuration, a node without an active ML-DSA signing key installs
no baseline (the resolver keeps denying), never a classical-only baseline.
Enums§
- Boot
Policy Error - Errors from the boot path. All fail-closed: on any error nothing is installed
and
crate::mac::compiled_policystaysNone(the resolver keeps denying).
Functions§
- compile_
sign_ load_ install - Compile a validated grant into a TE policy, hybrid-PQC-sign it, verify it
once at load, and install it process-globally. Returns the installed
CompiledPolicy. - hash_
reviewed_ boot_ policy - Compute the production canonical hash of public boot inputs without loading authority keys. Signing still requires an independent exact-generation/hash review.
- install_
baseline_ boot_ policy - Install the node’s baseline compiled policy at daemon boot.
- install_
configured_ boot_ policy - Load explicitly configured artifacts against the OS-owned deployment’s chain-enrolled Policy authority, then install before the baseline OnceLock. No signing keys, runtime approval, unanchored roster, or fallback are used. DID-anchored deployments are intentionally unsupported by this bounded path.
- sign_
reviewed_ boot_ policy - One-shot offline authority action, never called by daemon boot. The operator explicitly reviews an enrollment-only policy and empty UCAN; this does not infer approval or validate a delegated UCAN chain on their behalf. Both objects are signed by the existing enrolled Policy authority with distinct signature domains. No new keys or trust ceremony are created.