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Module bootload

Module bootload 

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S4 policy bootload (#570): the missing daemon-boot step that installs a verified CompiledPolicy so the MAC PDP inputs are real.

Everything else in the S4 stack was already built (the LatticeTeEvaluator PDP, the CachingAvc, the PolicyLoader, the SignedPolicy sign/verify path), but nothing ever ran the compile → sign → verify-load → install chain at startup. So crate::mac::compiled_policy (the process-global OnceLock) stayed None, and every downstream seam fell back to deny-all — in particular crate::mac::exchange_enrollment_resolver returned the DenyUnlabeledResolver, which is what kept #698’s already-merged EnrollmentSubjectContextResolver inert. This module is the one missing wire.

Installing a compiled policy makes the PDP inputs real: it flips crate::mac::compiled_policy to Some, so the enrollment resolver resolves genuine clearances instead of denying every DID. The active 9P PEP records the loaded generation and policy hash on every audited decision.

§Fail-closed

The signer is hybrid (EdDSA + ML-DSA-65 COSE composite) and the loader verifies with require_pq = true (design §14 — never Ed25519-only). Configured artifacts require only the enrolled authority’s public keys; absent configuration, a node without an active ML-DSA signing key installs no baseline (the resolver keeps denying), never a classical-only baseline.

Enums§

BootPolicyError
Errors from the boot path. All fail-closed: on any error nothing is installed and crate::mac::compiled_policy stays None (the resolver keeps denying).

Functions§

compile_sign_load_install
Compile a validated grant into a TE policy, hybrid-PQC-sign it, verify it once at load, and install it process-globally. Returns the installed CompiledPolicy.
hash_reviewed_boot_policy
Compute the production canonical hash of public boot inputs without loading authority keys. Signing still requires an independent exact-generation/hash review.
install_baseline_boot_policy
Install the node’s baseline compiled policy at daemon boot.
install_configured_boot_policy
Load explicitly configured artifacts against the OS-owned deployment’s chain-enrolled Policy authority, then install before the baseline OnceLock. No signing keys, runtime approval, unanchored roster, or fallback are used. DID-anchored deployments are intentionally unsupported by this bounded path.
sign_reviewed_boot_policy
One-shot offline authority action, never called by daemon boot. The operator explicitly reviews an enrollment-only policy and empty UCAN; this does not infer approval or validate a delegated UCAN chain on their behalf. Both objects are signed by the existing enrolled Policy authority with distinct signature domains. No new keys or trust ceremony are created.