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self_asserted_outer_pq_key

Function self_asserted_outer_pq_key 

Source
pub fn self_asserted_outer_pq_key(
    cose_composite_bytes: &[u8],
) -> Result<Option<MlDsaVerifyingKey>>
Expand description

The ML-DSA-65 verifying key the composite’s outer layer claims for itself, read out of that layer’s kid protected header.

§This value is not trusted

It is attacker-controlled wire data: whoever produced the composite chose it. It carries exactly one property — an outer signature that verifies against it proves the producer held the matching ML-DSA-65 private key — and it proves nothing about that key belonging to the identity in the inner EdDSA layer. verify_composite therefore never reads it as an anchor; it only compares it against a key the caller resolved from a trust source, and rejects a mismatch.

The one legitimate use is as a candidate offered to a trust-on-first-use record — and verifying the composite against it is not sufficient grounds to record the pairing.

An earlier revision of this documentation claimed that a verifying composite proves possession of both private keys. It does not, and the difference is the whole attack: the nesting binds inner→outer only, so anyone holding a copy of a valid inner layer can drop the outer, re-sign payload ‖ inner_signature with an ML-DSA key of their own, and produce a composite that verifies under the captured identity. What a plain verifying composite proves is possession of the ML-DSA-65 key plus possession of one replayable Ed25519 signature.

A recorded pairing therefore additionally requires CompositeVerified::pq_bound — the inner layer’s signed commitment to the key above it (see PQ_BINDING_HEADER_LABEL).

Returns Ok(None) when the composite has no outer layer (classical-only) or when its outer layer carries no kid.