Expand description
Nested-COSE hybrid composite signing for the hyprstream SignedEnvelope
(EdDSA + ML-DSA-65).
§Where this sits in the PQUIP hybrid-signature taxonomy
In the taxonomy of draft-ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums §1.3.4 this
construction is still Weak Non-Separable (WNS), not Strong Non-Separable
(SNS). SNS requires fusion — the two algorithms’ signatures combined into a
single object that cannot be verified by either component alone. We do not do
that: we emit two distinct COSE_Sign1 signatures and bind them by nesting
(the outer signs payload ‖ inner_sig).
As of #278 the inner EdDSA layer additionally binds a hybrid-composite alg-id
into its signed input when produced in Hybrid mode (see
HYBRID_COMPOSITE_ALG_ID / build_hybrid_external_aad). This delivers
signature-level non-separability for the inner component: an inner EdDSA
signature lifted out of a Hybrid composite (its outer ML-DSA layer stripped)
is NO LONGER a valid standalone Classical signature, because its Sig_structure
was bound to the hybrid-alg-id that a Classical verifier does not reconstruct.
A genuine Classical-mode inner (no hybrid-alg-id) still verifies under a
Classical verifier — that intended interop is preserved. We keep the WNS label
because the two signatures remain separable objects (no fusion) and a
standalone outer ML-DSA layer is still independently meaningful; #278 closes
the inner-component separability gap, not the structural one.
Downgrade resistance is now enforced by BOTH crypto and policy:
- signature-level non-separability (#278): a stripped-inner attack fails the inner EdDSA signature check (AAD mismatch), not merely a policy gate.
require_pq(fail-closed Hybrid policy): a Hybrid verifier rejects any envelope lacking a valid outer ML-DSA-65 layer, so an attacker who strips the outer layer is also rejected by policy.- kid-anchoring: the PQ key is resolved from a [
PqTrustStore] keyed by the EdDSA signer identity, never self-asserted in the COSE object — closing the self-certification gap a naïve two-signature scheme has.
§What the nesting does buy
M3 (#152) replaced an earlier COSE_Sign with two independent signatures
over the same payload (a fail-open, trivially strippable scheme). The nesting
below is a real improvement over that: because the outer ML-DSA-65 signature
covers payload ‖ inner_eddsa_signature, the inner signature is part of the
outer’s signed message — so once a verifier has committed to checking the
outer (Hybrid policy), it cannot be fed a mismatched inner/outer pair. The
nesting binds the two layers together; the requirement to check the outer
at all comes from policy.
Classical: external_aad
inner = EdDSA COSE_Sign1 over payload base_aad
Hybrid (#278 hybrid-alg-id bound; policy-enforced): external_aad
inner = EdDSA COSE_Sign1 over payload [base_aad, hybridAlgID]
outer = ML-DSA COSE_Sign1 over payload‖inner_sig [base_aad, hybridAlgID]Both layers bind the base external_aad (the CBOR [envelope_schema_id, inner_type_id] schema binding, see crate::cose_sign1::build_external_aad),
and — in Hybrid mode only — additionally bind a hybrid-composite
algorithm identifier (see HYBRID_COMPOSITE_ALG_ID) into both layers’
external_aad via build_hybrid_external_aad.
§Signature-level non-separability of the inner EdDSA (#278)
Per draft-ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums (§ Nested Construction /
Non-Separability), signature-level non-separability requires binding a
hybridAlgID into each component’s signed input: sig = Sign(hybridAlgID ‖ m).
We achieve this by extending the COSE external_aad (which RFC 9052 §4.4
folds into every layer’s Sig_structure) with the composite alg-id whenever
signing in Hybrid mode.
Consequence: the inner EdDSA COSE_Sign1 to-be-signed bytes produced in
Hybrid mode are now byte-distinct from those produced in Classical mode,
so a stripped inner EdDSA signature lifted out of a Hybrid composite is not
a valid standalone Classical signature — it fails verification at the
signature level (not merely the require_pq policy check). In Classical
mode the external_aad is left exactly as before (no hybrid-alg-id), so
classical-only signing/verification is byte-for-byte unchanged.
§Backwards-compatibility / transition window
This changes what is signed under Hybrid mode: a Hybrid signer at this
revision binds the hybrid-alg-id, so its inner EdDSA layer will NOT verify
against a pre-#278 Classical verifier that reconstructs the bare base AAD,
and vice-versa. Per WNS the classical sig/cnf fields on the envelope are
retained for the raw-EdDSA advertisement / JWT-cnf paths and are unaffected.
During a mixed-version deployment, peers MUST agree on the same policy
(Classical↔Classical or Hybrid↔Hybrid); a Hybrid producer talking to a
Classical-only consumer was already rejected by the require_pq policy, so
no new interop surface is broken — only the Hybrid inner AAD changed.
§Wire shape (SignedEnvelope.cose)
A definite-length CBOR array of two entries:
[ inner_cose_sign1_bytes : bstr,
outer_cose_sign1_bytes : bstr / null ] ; null in Classical modeThe signed payloads are detached (never embedded). Each COSE_Sign1 carries
its signer’s kid + alg in its protected header.
Structs§
- Composite
Verified - Outcome of composite verification.
Constants§
- ALG_
ML_ DSA_ 65 - IANA COSE algorithm id for ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, draft-ietf-cose-dilithium).
- HYBRID_
COMPOSITE_ ALG_ ID - Stable composite/hybrid algorithm identifier for the EdDSA + ML-DSA-65 component pair signed by this nested construction.
- PQ_
BINDING_ HEADER_ LABEL - Protected-header label under which the INNER EdDSA layer names the ML-DSA-65 verifying key that must sit above it.
Functions§
- assemble_
composite_ nested - Assemble the nested WNS composite from out-of-band signatures.
- assemble_
composite_ nested_ pq_ bound assemble_composite_nestedfor a composite whose inner layer commits to the ML-DSA-65 key above it.- build_
hybrid_ external_ aad - Extend a base
external_aadwith theHYBRID_COMPOSITE_ALG_IDbinding. - inner_
tbs - Compute the inner EdDSA layer’s detached to-be-signed bytes.
- inner_
tbs_ pq_ bound inner_tbsfor a composite whose inner layer commits to the ML-DSA-65 key above it (seePQ_BINDING_HEADER_LABEL).- outer_
tbs - Compute the outer ML-DSA-65 layer’s detached to-be-signed bytes over
payload ‖ inner_eddsa_signature(the inner→outer binding). - self_
asserted_ outer_ pq_ key - The ML-DSA-65 verifying key the composite’s outer layer claims for
itself, read out of that layer’s
kidprotected header. - sign_
composite - Sign
payload(detached) producing the CBOR-encoded nested COSE composite. - sign_
composite_ pq_ bound sign_composite, with the inner EdDSA layer additionally committing to the ML-DSA-65 key above it (seePQ_BINDING_HEADER_LABEL).- split_
composite - Split a nested composite blob into its raw component signatures
(ed25519_signature, Option<mldsa65_signature>). - verify_
composite - Verify a CBOR-encoded nested COSE composite against a detached
payload.