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JwtKeySource

Trait JwtKeySource 

Source
pub trait JwtKeySource:
    Send
    + Sync
    + 'static {
    // Required methods
    fn get_key<'life0, 'life1, 'life2, 'async_trait>(
        &'life0 self,
        issuer: &'life1 str,
        kid: Option<&'life2 str>,
    ) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<VerifyingKey>> + Send + 'async_trait>>
       where Self: 'async_trait,
             'life0: 'async_trait,
             'life1: 'async_trait,
             'life2: 'async_trait;
    fn is_trusted(&self, issuer: &str) -> bool;
    fn local_issuers(&self) -> &[String];

    // Provided methods
    fn get_keys<'life0, 'life1, 'life2, 'async_trait>(
        &'life0 self,
        issuer: &'life1 str,
        kid: Option<&'life2 str>,
    ) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>>> + Send + 'async_trait>>
       where Self: 'async_trait,
             'life0: 'async_trait,
             'life1: 'async_trait,
             'life2: 'async_trait { ... }
    fn ml_dsa_verifying_keys(&self) -> Vec<MlDsaVerifyingKey> ⓘ { ... }
    fn composite_key_set(&self) -> Arc<CompositeKeySet> ⓘ { ... }
    fn composite_pair(&self, kid: &str) -> Option<CompositeKeyPair> { ... }
    fn kid_algs(&self, _issuer: &str, _kid: &str) -> Vec<String> { ... }
}
Expand description

Source of JWT verification keys.

Abstracts key resolution for both local (cluster CA) and federated (external IdP) tokens. Services receive this at construction time, binding them to their trust anchors.

Required Methods§

Source

fn get_key<'life0, 'life1, 'life2, 'async_trait>( &'life0 self, issuer: &'life1 str, kid: Option<&'life2 str>, ) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<VerifyingKey>> + Send + 'async_trait>>
where Self: 'async_trait, 'life0: 'async_trait, 'life1: 'async_trait, 'life2: 'async_trait,

Get the verifying key for a given issuer and optional kid.

A supplied kid is a strict selector: implementations MUST return only the key published under that exact name or fail. It is never permission to substitute another co-published key. Kid-less multi-key verification uses JwtKeySource::get_keys instead.

§Errors

Returns error if the issuer is untrusted or key resolution fails.

Source

fn is_trusted(&self, issuer: &str) -> bool

Check if an issuer is trusted (before attempting key fetch).

Returns true for local issuers and configured federated issuers.

Source

fn local_issuers(&self) -> &[String]

List of issuer URLs considered “local” (for subject formatting).

Used by Claims::subject() to determine whether to namespace the subject with the issuer URL (federated) or use it bare (local).

Provided Methods§

Source

fn get_keys<'life0, 'life1, 'life2, 'async_trait>( &'life0 self, issuer: &'life1 str, kid: Option<&'life2 str>, ) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>>> + Send + 'async_trait>>
where Self: 'async_trait, 'life0: 'async_trait, 'life1: 'async_trait, 'life2: 'async_trait,

Resolve all algorithm-compatible candidates for an issuer/kid pair.

This is the safe default for verifying a kid-less JWT: when no kid selector is present the verifier cannot know which published key signed the token, so it MUST retain every compatible candidate and try each until one verifies — never collapse the published set to a positional singleton (first/next/values().next()). See #1183 / #1184.

Single-key sources return a one-element vec. JWKS-backed sources override this to return every Ed25519 entry when kid is None.

Callers pair this with crate::auth::jwt::decode_with_any_key to try each candidate against the JWT signature.

Source

fn ml_dsa_verifying_keys(&self) -> Vec<MlDsaVerifyingKey> ⓘ

Get all current ML-DSA-65 verifying keys for PQ-hybrid JWT verification.

Returns keys for all rotation slots (drain/active/lead) so that tokens signed by any current slot can be verified. Empty vec disables PQ verification.

Source

fn composite_key_set(&self) -> Arc<CompositeKeySet> ⓘ

Return the authoritative exact-pair composite key ledger.

Source

fn composite_pair(&self, kid: &str) -> Option<CompositeKeyPair>

Resolve the exact composite verification pair for a JOSE kid.

The default consults the composite key ledger. Sources that also hold an out-of-ledger CA composite pair (the service-JWT plane, where the ML-DSA-65 half is derived from the CA JWT signing key rather than rotated through the ledger) override this to consult it as well. An unknown kid resolves to None — verification fails closed.

Source

fn kid_algs(&self, _issuer: &str, _kid: &str) -> Vec<String>

Return the list of alg values bound to a given kid in the JWKS.

This is used as a stripping defense: when a JWKS entry carries a composite-signature alg (e.g. ML-DSA-65-Ed25519) under a kid, the verifier MUST require that any JWT presenting that kid uses the exact same alg — preventing an attacker who controls one component key from presenting a single-algorithm JWT under the composite kid.

Default implementation returns an empty vec, which means “no policy constraint” (legacy behavior). Implementations backed by JWKS should override to surface the algs they observed.

Implementors§