Expand description
Native MAC: security labels, lattice, subject contexts, genesis labeling (S1, #567). Platform-independent (no std-only deps) so it compiles for wasm. Native MAC — security labels, the lattice, subject contexts, and genesis labeling. S1 (#567), the foundation of epic #547.
This module is the TCB seam the rest of the security epic consumes. It defines what a label is, how labels compare (dominance ⊒ and IFC join ⊔), where a subject’s clearance comes from, where an object’s label comes from, and how everything gets an initial label (genesis). It deliberately contains no enforcement, no policy distribution, and no token logic — those are S2/S4/S6.
§The lattice (small + verifiable, by design)
A label is a point in the product lattice
Level × Assurance × P(Compartment)
(MLS) (#548) (need-to-know)- Level — total order
public < internal < confidential < secret. - Assurance — total order
unverified < classical < pq-hybrid, derived from verified key material (#548), never claimed. - Compartments — powerset lattice under ⊆ (a closed vocabulary, policy).
Dominance is the product order (≥ on each total axis, ⊇ on the compartment
set); join is component-wise (max / max / ∪). Both are pure functions on
SecurityLabel with no policy argument — content truth, uncircumventable.
§Interface contract for S2 (enforcement) and S4 (PDP)
S1 hands the downstream tickets exactly these stable entry-points:
-
S2 — reference-monitor per-op check (#568). For each op the monitor:
- obtains the object label via [
manifest::LabeledObject::security_label] —None⇒ DENY (unlabeled object); - obtains the subject context via
[
context::SubjectContextClaims::security_context] (clearance from verified claims, assurance derived from verified key material) —None⇒ DENY (unlabeled subject); - evaluates the MAC floor [
context::SecurityContext::can_access] (≡SecurityLabel::can_access) —false⇒ DENY. The monitor takes object labels ONLY fromLabeledObject, never from a token/UCAN/caveat (design §3, §14). It needs noLatticeon the hot path: dominance is intrinsic.
- obtains the object label via [
-
S2 — IFC at seal/rollup (#568). A derived object’s label =
SecurityLabel::join_allover its provenance inputs’ labels. Aggregation cannot launder classification. -
S4 — PDP / lattice engine (#570). The PDP owns the [
lattice::Lattice] policy object: itvalidates labels at enrollment/seal, exposes the pinned [lattice::LatticeVersion] for the(UCAN, bundle_hash)approval binding (S5), and computes the label-ceiling clamp (§5a) asmin/dominance over the lattice. The PDP never re-implements the order — it reuses the intrinsicSecurityLabelalgebra, so the PDP’s clamp and the monitor’s floor are provably the same relation. -
Both — derived value:
effective = approved-ceiling ∩ MAC clearance ∩ self-attenuation(design §5). The “∩ MAC clearance” factor is exactly the dominance/clamp defined here; S5/S6 compose it, they do not redefine it.
§BLOCKERS (what S1 cannot finish, and why)
S1 ships everything that is genuinely unblocked (the label + lattice + ops + subject context + genesis mechanism + static-node labels, all tested). The following are defined as seams here but gated on other work:
-
Content-bound manifest labels ← the data-plane CAS manifest store. The content-addressed manifest with a
security_labelfield does not exist yet (today’s “manifests” are OCI image / release / context manifests, none data-plane CAS). S1 defines the [manifest::ContentBoundLabel] contract + [manifest::LabeledObject] seam; the implementation (label-in-CID binding +verify_binding) lands with the CAS manifest layer. Static-node labels are NOT blocked and are implemented here. -
Subject clearance wire field on
Claims/envelope ← S8 (#574, hybrid envelope). S1 defines the [context::SubjectContextClaims] trait that the verified claims will implement; the concreteclearancefield is added toClaims/common.capnpunder S8 so the new authz field ships on the hybrid-signed (EdDSA + ML-DSA-65) envelope, not the classical one. Until then S2/S4 program against the trait and test with a stub. -
Assurance derivation source ← #441 / #280 (authoritative key binding)
register_pq_trust. [context::VerifiedKeyMaterial] is the seam; the production of it (was the ML-DSA-65 anchor actually bound + verified for this identity?) is the envelope-verification + key-binding layer’s job. Until a binding is authoritative, an identity isClassicalat best andUnverifiedif even the classical signature can’t be checked — both fail-closed.
-
Compartment vocabulary / genesis content ← S3 (#569,
$scope/TE annotations). S1 defines [lattice::Lattice] (the closed vocabulary holder) and [genesis::GenesisMap] (the path→label mechanism + the completeness gate); the actual compartment names and the per-node label table come from the schema annotations + site policy that S3 produces. -
PQ-confidentiality labels are unsatisfiable today ← #153 (streaming DH → ML-KEM-768 hybrid KEM). The assurance axis covers signature assurance, which is shippable. A future confidentiality requirement (data that must travel a PQ-KEM path) has no satisfying transport until #153 wires
pq_kem_ciphertext; such a label is simply undominated → fail-closed, which is correct. No type change needed when #153 lands — it’s a new compartment/level value, not a new axis.
Re-exports§
pub use activation::anonymous_floor;pub use activation::block_identity_widening_for_unverified_attach_transport;pub use activation::flush_verified_subject_cache_generation;pub use activation::global_mac_activation_control;pub use activation::remember_verified_claims;pub use activation::remember_verified_claims_with_credential;pub use activation::remember_verified_subject;pub use activation::revoke_verified_subject_credential;pub use activation::subject_context;pub use activation::subject_context_with;pub use activation::MacActivationControl;pub use activation::MacActivationError;pub use activation::MacActivationEvidence;pub use activation::MacActivationMode;pub use bind::clamp_descendant;pub use bind::BindLabel;pub use bind::BindLabelMap;pub use context::SecurityContext;pub use context::SubjectContextClaims;pub use context::VerifiedKeyMaterial;pub use dispatch_pep::check_dispatch_mac;pub use dispatch_pep::global_mac_dispatch_pep;pub use dispatch_pep::install_mac_dispatch_pep;pub use dispatch_pep::DefaultMacDispatchPep;pub use dispatch_pep::DenyAllMacPep;pub use dispatch_pep::DenyAllObjectResolver;pub use dispatch_pep::MacDecision;pub use dispatch_pep::MacDenyReason;pub use dispatch_pep::MacDispatchPep;pub use dispatch_pep::RpcObjectLabelResolver;pub use genesis::GenesisMap;pub use genesis::GenesisReport;pub use label::Assurance;pub use label::Compartment;pub use label::CompartmentSet;pub use label::CredentialClearance;pub use label::Level;pub use label::SecurityLabel;pub use label::MAX_COMPARTMENTS;pub use lattice::LabelError;pub use lattice::Lattice;pub use lattice::LatticeCodecError;pub use lattice::LatticeDecodeError;pub use lattice::LatticeVersion;pub use manifest::bind_time_label;pub use manifest::import_label;pub use manifest::ContentBoundLabel;pub use manifest::LabeledObject;pub use manifest::ObjectLabelResolver;pub use manifest::ObjectRef;pub use manifest::StaticNodeLabel;pub use moq_resolve::DeclaredTrackPolicyResolver;pub use moq_resolve::DenyAllMoqEventResolver;pub use moq_resolve::MoqEventLabelResolver;pub use moq_resolve::MoqEventObjectRef;pub use moq_resolve::MoqEventPlane;pub use moq_resolve::MoqEventPolicyRow;pub use moq_resolve::MoqEventPolicyTable;pub use moq_resolve::TrackPolicyError;pub use moq_resolve::MAX_TRACK_SEGMENTS;pub use moq_resolve::MAX_TRACK_SEGMENT_BYTES;pub use moq_resolve::SUPPORTED_TRACK_POLICY_REVISION;pub use pep::bounded_audit_coordinate;pub use pep::ClearanceSource;pub use pep::DenyAllClearanceSource;pub use pep::MoqEventAction;pub use pep::MoqEventPep;pub use pep::MoqMacAuditReason;pub use pep::MoqMacAuditRecord;pub use pep::MoqMacAuditSink;pub use pep::BOUNDED_AUDIT_COORDINATE_MAX_BYTES;pub use pep::MAX_AUDIT_COORDINATE_PREFIX_BYTES;
Modules§
- activation
- Coverage-gated MAC activation control and verified-subject context cache.
- bind
- Carrier (c) — bind-time labels for synthetic VFS mounts (#699 scope item 1, epic #547).
- context
- The subject security context — a subject’s verified clearance, the
subject.ctxside of the per-op dominance checksubject.ctx ⊒ object.label. - dispatch_
pep - The mandatory RPC dispatch PEP (epic #1267 T3, #1268).
- genesis
- Genesis labeling — the initial-SID /
file_contextsequivalent. - label
- The security label — the content-bound classification carried by every object, and the verified clearance carried by every subject.
- lattice
- The MAC lattice as policy — defined once, versioned, pinned.
- manifest
- The object-label seam — where an object’s content-bound label comes from.
- moq_
resolve - Typed MoQ/event object identity + declared track-policy resolver (v16 §10, WS-I / #1510).
- pep
- MoQ / event-plane MAC policy-enforcement point (epic #547, #1271; typed resolver v16 §10 / #1510).