pub trait ContentBoundLabel: LabeledObject {
// Required method
fn content_id(&self) -> &[u8] ⓘ;
// Provided method
fn verify_binding(&self) -> bool { ... }
}Expand description
The binding contract a real CAS manifest must satisfy: the label is bound to the content hash, so an attacker cannot relabel without producing a new CID (and thus a new object). This is the property that makes the object label content-truth rather than a mutable xattr.
S1 specifies the contract; the implementation lands with the manifest layer.
A conforming manifest serializes security_label inside the bytes that the
CID covers — verifying this is the manifest layer’s test, asserted here as a
documented invariant.
Required Methods§
Sourcefn content_id(&self) -> &[u8] ⓘ
fn content_id(&self) -> &[u8] ⓘ
The content identifier (hash) of the manifest. The label returned by
LabeledObject::security_label MUST be part of the preimage of this
CID.
Provided Methods§
Sourcefn verify_binding(&self) -> bool
fn verify_binding(&self) -> bool
Recompute the CID over the manifest bytes (including the label) and check
it equals content_id. A real impl uses this to verify the binding
when a manifest is loaded from the store — a mismatch ⇒ tampered ⇒ deny.
Default impl is false (fail-closed) so a stub that forgets to implement
verification denies rather than trusts.