pub struct VerifiedAt9pKeys { /* private fields */ }Expand description
The content-verified subject key set of a did:at9p capsule, re-expressed
in the rpc-local key types so this crate need not depend on hyprstream-pds
(pds depends on rpc; the dependency does not reverse).
subjectKeys is a set of currently-usable identity keys, never an ordered
list with a positional “primary” (#1188 / #1183): a producer publishes the
new key alongside the old to rotate without a flag day, and a classical key
beside a PQ/composite key for hybrid rollout. A consumer selects the member
it recognizes — here Self::for_ed25519, keyed on the Ed25519 application
signer identity — and skips the rest, never letting position confer
authority. The set is non-empty and its Ed25519 halves are unique (enforced
by the capsule schema), so selection is unambiguous.
A VerifiedAt9pKeys is only constructable via the GATE mints
(VerifiedAt9pKeys::new_gate_verified / VerifiedAt9pKeys::new_gate_verified_set),
which only an At9pCapsuleResolver that ran the A4 GATE pipeline
(canon→hash→sig, #884) to completion reaches. The private field makes the
“only constructable after the GATE ran” provenance a type-level invariant
rather than a bare rustdoc claim: arbitrary code cannot build one with an
unverified ed25519↔ml_dsa_65 binding, so holding one is proof the binding
came from content-verified capsule material, not a config file or a
caller assertion (the D2/#894 provenance boundary, hardened in #964).
Implementations§
Source§impl VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl VerifiedAt9pKeys
Sourcepub fn new_gate_verified(
ed25519: [u8; 32],
ml_dsa_65: MlDsaVerifyingKey,
) -> Self
pub fn new_gate_verified( ed25519: [u8; 32], ml_dsa_65: MlDsaVerifyingKey, ) -> Self
The GATE mint for a single verified subject key — a convenience over
Self::new_gate_verified_set for the (common) single-key capsule.
This is the constructor-witness chokepoint: the field is private, so the
only way to produce a VerifiedAt9pKeys is one of these mints, which
encode the GATE-ran provenance in their names. Trusted callers are the A4
GATE resolver implementations (the real At9pCapsuleResolver impl in
hyprstream-pds::at9p_resolver, plus in-crate test fixtures). Code that
has not run the GATE has no business calling this — review a new call site
as a provenance decision, not a mechanical field set.
(Rust cannot seal this across crates — hyprstream-pds is a dependent of
hyprstream-rpc, so rpc has no way to grant pds the mint while denying it
to arbitrary code. The private field + named mints convert the provenance
from “any code can write the struct literal” to “any code must go through
one review-visible chokepoint”, which is the proportionate hardening; the
trust root remains “whoever injects the gate is trusted”.)
Sourcepub fn new_gate_verified_set(keys: Vec<VerifiedAt9pKey>) -> Result<Self>
pub fn new_gate_verified_set(keys: Vec<VerifiedAt9pKey>) -> Result<Self>
The GATE mint for the full verified subject key set (#1188).
The projected set MUST be non-empty (the schema guarantees it) and MUST
have unique Ed25519 halves so Self::for_ed25519 selection is
unambiguous — the same discipline the capsule schema enforces on
subjectKeys. A violation is a projection bug, not attacker input, so it
is a fail-closed Err rather than a silent first-wins.
Sourcepub fn key(ed25519: [u8; 32], ml_dsa_65: MlDsaVerifyingKey) -> VerifiedAt9pKey
pub fn key(ed25519: [u8; 32], ml_dsa_65: MlDsaVerifyingKey) -> VerifiedAt9pKey
Build a VerifiedAt9pKey for the set mint — pds-side projection helper.
Sourcepub fn for_ed25519(&self, ed25519: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<&VerifiedAt9pKey>
pub fn for_ed25519(&self, ed25519: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<&VerifiedAt9pKey>
Select the verified subject key whose Ed25519 half equals ed25519, if
the capsule published one — the set-semantics accessor (#1188).
A consumer holding an Ed25519 application-signer identity finds its
hybrid pair by identity and takes the atomically-bound ML-DSA-65 half from
the same entry. Returns None when no published key matches; the caller
then rejects fail-closed rather than falling back to a positional key.
Sourcepub fn publishes_ed25519(&self, ed25519: &[u8; 32]) -> bool
pub fn publishes_ed25519(&self, ed25519: &[u8; 32]) -> bool
Whether ed25519 is one of the published, content-verified subject keys.
Sourcepub fn keys(&self) -> &[VerifiedAt9pKey]
pub fn keys(&self) -> &[VerifiedAt9pKey]
All content-verified subject keys in the set (non-empty).
Trait Implementations§
Source§impl Clone for VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl Clone for VerifiedAt9pKeys
Source§fn clone(&self) -> VerifiedAt9pKeys
fn clone(&self) -> VerifiedAt9pKeys
1.0.0 (const: unstable) · Source§fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
source. Read moreAuto Trait Implementations§
impl Freeze for VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl RefUnwindSafe for VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl Send for VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl Sync for VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl Unpin for VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl UnsafeUnpin for VerifiedAt9pKeys
impl UnwindSafe for VerifiedAt9pKeys
Blanket Implementations§
Source§impl<T> BorrowMut<T> for Twhere
T: ?Sized,
impl<T> BorrowMut<T> for Twhere
T: ?Sized,
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fn borrow_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T
Source§impl<T> CloneToUninit for Twhere
T: Clone,
impl<T> CloneToUninit for Twhere
T: Clone,
§impl<T> Instrument for T
impl<T> Instrument for T
§fn instrument(self, span: Span) -> Instrumented<Self>
fn instrument(self, span: Span) -> Instrumented<Self>
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fn in_current_span(self) -> Instrumented<Self>
Source§impl<T> IntoEither for T
impl<T> IntoEither for T
Source§fn into_either(self, into_left: bool) -> Either<Self, Self>
fn into_either(self, into_left: bool) -> Either<Self, Self>
self into a Left variant of Either<Self, Self>
if into_left is true.
Converts self into a Right variant of Either<Self, Self>
otherwise. Read moreSource§fn into_either_with<F>(self, into_left: F) -> Either<Self, Self>
fn into_either_with<F>(self, into_left: F) -> Either<Self, Self>
self into a Left variant of Either<Self, Self>
if into_left(&self) returns true.
Converts self into a Right variant of Either<Self, Self>
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