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LifecyclePolicy

Trait LifecyclePolicy 

Source
pub trait LifecyclePolicy: Send + Sync {
    // Required method
    fn authorize(
        &self,
        caller: &Subject,
        id: &str,
        verb: LifecycleVerb,
    ) -> Result<(), String>;
}
Expand description

Fail-closed authorization seam for destructive ctl lifecycle verbs (#1272, epic #1267 T3).

ExecMount’s write path previously ignored _caller entirely when invoking stop/kill/destroy. This trait is the mediation point: when a policy is installed on the mount (ExecMount::new_with_lifecycle), every destructive verb must pass authorize before the backend is touched.

Fail-closed contract: returning Err ⇒ the verb is refused (MountError::PermissionDenied); there is no permissive default inside a policy. The mount’s status-quo (no policy installed) is represented by lifecycle: None, NOT by a permissive policy — mirroring the hyprstream_vfs::NamespacePep activation posture (the separately-gated B-lane flips construction sites to armed).

The clearance-provenance dependency (#698) is the same as the VFS PEP’s: a production policy resolves the caller’s SecurityContext from verified credential material and applies MAC can_access against the instance’s label. Until #698 wires that, the policy is a structural seam.

Required Methods§

Source

fn authorize( &self, caller: &Subject, id: &str, verb: LifecycleVerb, ) -> Result<(), String>

Authorize verb on instance id by caller. Ok(()) permits; Err(detail) denies with a human-readable reason.

Implementors§